IronSeal is the out-of-band communications channel your incident response team trusts when email, Slack, and Teams can't be.
A threat actor with a foothold may already hold mailbox access, valid Slack/Teams session tokens, and presence on your endpoints. Coordinate containment on those channels and you hand the intruder your playbook — time to destroy evidence, accelerate exfiltration, or deploy ransomware ahead of your response.
These channels share fate with the environment under investigation: same identity provider, same vendors, same network. You cannot investigate a house using the intruder's intercom. The response has to move to a channel that lives entirely outside — one the attacker cannot reach and cannot already have compromised.
No agent, connector, or integration inside the corporate network. Nothing on your side for the attacker to compromise to reach it. Responders open it from any clean device.
Messages are ECDH P-256 + AES-256-GCM encrypted on-device. The server stores ciphertext only — no plaintext field exists. A breach of our own infrastructure yields unreadable blobs.
During an active incident you cannot trust any file. IronSeal transmits encrypted text only — the entire attachment attack category is removed from the response channel itself.
Reading a message requires a fresh WebAuthn biometric. On a shared, borrowed, or seized device, an unlocked screen does not expose the response thread.
SHA-256 hash-chained events record who and when — never content. A defensible, verifiable record of the coordination for post-incident review and legal proceedings.
Repeated failed authentication trips a dead-man's switch: messages purge and both parties are notified. A lost device mid-incident does not quietly wait to be read.
Security professionals read critically, and they should. Here is exactly where IronSeal stops. If any of this rules it out for you, better to know now than mid-incident.
Supports the Containment, Eradication & Recovery phase by enabling the IR team to coordinate over a channel the attacker cannot observe. Provisioned during Preparation; deliberately absent from Detection & Analysis, which your SIEM/EDR own.
The hash-chained, tamper-evident audit log provides a verifiable, content-free record of when coordination happened and who participated — supporting the Post-Incident Activity review, regulatory notifications, and any subsequent legal process.
Read the full analysis in the threat model →
You cannot provision a break-glass channel during the breach. Pre-provision your responders, document the activation criteria, and rehearse the switch.